阅读说明：本技术 基于动态演化视角的电网企业拓展综合能源服务市场的辅助决策方法 (Power grid enterprise comprehensive energy service market expanding auxiliary decision-making method based on dynamic evolution visual angle ) 是由 孙秋洁 叶玲节 刘军 王岑峰 冯也 张韦维 李俊杰 许彦斌 赵爱林 吴浩宇 颜启 于 2021-07-15 设计创作，主要内容包括：本发明涉及一种基于动态演化视角的电网企业拓展综合能源服务市场的辅助决策方法,包括以下步骤：S1、分析电网企业与发电企业在综合能源服务市场可能采取的策略；S2、建立以电网企业和发电企业为代表的竞合博弈模型,分析电网企业与发电企业的复制动态方程,得到双方博弈的演化图和相位图,进而分析外部环境变化对电网企业和发电企业的竞合行为演化路径；S3、通过数值仿真对竞合博弈模型进行算例分析,验证竞合博弈模型的有效性及科学性。本发明可以提高电网企业在综合能源服务市场中竞争力与市场占有率,为电网企业在转型综合能源服务商过程中提供发展策略。(The invention relates to an auxiliary decision method for expanding a comprehensive energy service market of a power grid enterprise based on a dynamic evolution visual angle, which comprises the following steps of: s1, analyzing strategies possibly adopted by power grid enterprises and power generation enterprises in the comprehensive energy service market; s2, establishing a competition game model represented by a power grid enterprise and a power generation enterprise, analyzing a replication dynamic equation of the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise to obtain an evolutionary graph and a phase graph of the game of the two parties, and further analyzing an evolutionary path of competition behaviors of external environment changes to the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise; and S3, carrying out example analysis on the competitive game model through numerical simulation, and verifying the effectiveness and the scientificity of the competitive game model. The invention can improve the competitiveness and market share of the power grid enterprise in the comprehensive energy service market and provide a development strategy for the power grid enterprise in the process of transforming the comprehensive energy service provider.)

1. An auxiliary decision method for expanding a comprehensive energy service market of a power grid enterprise based on a dynamic evolution visual angle is characterized by comprising the following steps:

s1, analyzing strategies possibly adopted by power grid enterprises and power generation enterprises in the comprehensive energy service market;

s2, establishing a competition game model represented by a power grid enterprise and a power generation enterprise, analyzing a replication dynamic equation of the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise to obtain an evolutionary graph and a phase graph of the game of the two parties, and further analyzing an evolutionary path of competition behaviors of external environment changes to the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise;

and S3, carrying out example analysis on the competitive game model through numerical simulation, and verifying the effectiveness and the scientificity of the competitive game model.

2. The dynamic evolution perspective-based power grid enterprise comprehensive energy service market decision-making method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the competitive game model has the following basic assumptions:

assume that 1: the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise cannot effectively share information, the information between the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise is not completely public and transparent, and the two parties follow the principle of rationality in the game process;

assume 2: if a power grid enterprise and a power generation enterprise select a cooperation strategy to jointly develop a certain comprehensive energy service project, the project efficiently utilizes energy and protects the environment, and then the enterprises of the two parties not only obtain good social public opinion, but also obtain additional financial rewards of the government;

assume that 3: if the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise diverge in the process of cooperating with a certain project to cause cooperative failure, developing competition for the purpose, and proposing that one party who stops the cooperation and wants to develop the competition needs to pay default funds specified by a cooperative contract to the other party;

assume 4: the probability of the power generation enterprises selecting cooperation is x, and the probability of the selection competition is 1-x; the power grid enterprise selects the probability of cooperation as y and selects the probability of competition as 1-y; x and y are both functions of time t.

3. The dynamic evolution perspective-based power grid enterprise comprehensive energy service market decision-making method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the method for establishing a competitive game model represented by a power grid enterprise and a power generation enterprise comprises the following steps:

the power generation enterprise (the participating main body a) and the power grid enterprise (the participating main body b) have own conventional stable income before cooperation, and the conventional income is set asBoth parties develop comprehensive energy service project through cooperationThe obtained additional benefit is set asB is set as a financial reward issued by the government for the comprehensive energy service project cooperatively developed by the power generation enterprise and the power grid enterpriseⁱ(i ═ a, b), the cost of both parties in collaboratively developing the renewable energy service project is set asSince two parties may end up competing in a collaborative process, the cost incurred by the obsolete renewable energy services is set asThe part of the cost comprises the cost such as time generated for terminating the cooperative relationship, related expenses and the like, wherein the default money to be paid for terminating the cooperative relationship is set as D, and the income matrix of the power generation enterprise and the power grid enterprise for developing the comprehensive energy service project in a cooperative manner is set by the parameters as follows:

4. the dynamic evolution perspective-based power grid enterprise extended comprehensive energy service market assistant decision method as claimed in claim 3,

the yield of the power generation enterprise selection cooperation is as follows:

the yield of the power generation enterprise selection competition is as follows:

the average income of power generation enterprises is as follows:

the yield of the power grid enterprise selection cooperation is as follows:

the yield of the power grid enterprise selection competition is as follows:

the average yield of the power grid enterprise is as follows:

the replicon dynamic equation of the power generation enterprise is as follows:

when F' (x) ═ 0, x can be obtained^a＝0、x^b＝1、

The replication subsystem dynamic equation of the power grid enterprise is as follows:

when F' (y) ═ 0, y is obtained^a＝0、y^b＝1、

5. The dynamic evolution perspective-based power grid enterprise integrated energy service market decision-making method as claimed in claim 4, wherein the simultaneous equations (7) and (8) can obtain that the system has 5 equilibrium points, which are: (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1) (x)^*，y^*) (ii) a Assuming that the determinant and the trace of the Jacobian matrix are respectively D and T, when D is more than 0 and T is less than 0, the point is an evolution stable strategy, when D is more than 0 and T is more than 0, the point is an unstable strategy, and when D is less than 0, the point is a saddle point; the Jacobian matrix for the tournament game is as follows:

6. the dynamic evolution perspective-based power grid enterprise extended integrated energy service market decision-making method as claimed in claim 5, wherein the equilibrium point and stability of the system equation are analyzed within the plane R { (x, y) |0 ≦ x ≦ 1,0 ≦ y ≦ 1} according toAndthe constraint condition can be obtained as

Technical Field

The invention relates to a dynamic evolution visual angle-based competitive game of a power grid enterprise and a power generation enterprise, in particular to a dynamic evolution visual angle-based auxiliary decision method for the power grid enterprise to expand a comprehensive energy service market.

Background

At present, research on development strategies of comprehensive energy providers mainly focuses on two aspects of enterprise differentiated operation strategies and comprehensive energy system operation strategies, and valuable experience is provided for commercial operation of the comprehensive energy providers in China. However, the problem of selecting a competitive strategy among the various entities of the integrated energy service provider over time is not considered from the macroscopic perspective of the integrated energy service market. The power grid enterprise as an important hub for connecting the energy production end and the consumption end has natural advantages in the aspects of infrastructure, technical talents, brand users, practical experience and the like, and meanwhile, the disadvantages of insufficient flexibility of the enterprise, insufficient energy production capital and the like become the limitation of the competitiveness and market share promotion of the power grid enterprise in the comprehensive energy service market. Therefore, how to grasp market laws, identify key competitors and adopt scientific development strategies becomes a key problem to be solved urgently in the process of transforming comprehensive energy service providers of power grid enterprises.

Disclosure of Invention

The invention aims to provide an auxiliary decision method for expanding the comprehensive energy service market of a power grid enterprise based on a dynamic evolution view angle, which can improve the competitiveness and market share of the power grid enterprise in the comprehensive energy service market.

The technical scheme adopted by the invention for solving the technical problems is as follows: an auxiliary decision-making method for expanding a comprehensive energy service market of a power grid enterprise based on a dynamic evolution visual angle is constructed, and comprises the following steps:

s1, analyzing strategies possibly adopted by power grid enterprises and power generation enterprises in the comprehensive energy service market;

s2, establishing a competition game model represented by a power grid enterprise and a power generation enterprise, analyzing a replication dynamic equation of the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise to obtain an evolutionary graph and a phase graph of the game of the two parties, and further analyzing an evolutionary path of competition behaviors of external environment changes to the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise;

and S3, carrying out example analysis on the competitive game model through numerical simulation, and verifying the effectiveness and the scientificity of the competitive game model.

According to the scheme, the basic assumption of the competitive game model is as follows:

assume that 1: the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise cannot effectively share information, the information between the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise is not completely public and transparent, and the two parties follow the principle of rationality in the game process;

assume 2: if a power grid enterprise and a power generation enterprise select a cooperation strategy to jointly develop a certain comprehensive energy service project, the project efficiently utilizes energy and protects the environment, and then the enterprises of the two parties not only obtain good social public opinion, but also obtain additional financial rewards of the government;

assume that 3: if the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise diverge in the process of cooperating with a certain project to cause cooperative failure, developing competition for the purpose, and proposing that one party who stops the cooperation and wants to develop the competition needs to pay default funds specified by a cooperative contract to the other party;

assume 4: the probability of the power generation enterprises selecting cooperation is x, and the probability of the selection competition is 1-x; the power grid enterprise selects the probability of cooperation as y and selects the probability of competition as 1-y; x and y are both functions of time t.

According to the scheme, the method for establishing the competitive game model represented by the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise comprises the following steps:

the power generation enterprise (the participating main body a) and the power grid enterprise (the participating main body b) have own conventional stable income before cooperation, and the conventional income is set asThe additional benefit obtained by the two parties through the cooperative development of the comprehensive energy service project is set asB is set as a financial reward issued by the government for the comprehensive energy service project cooperatively developed by the power generation enterprise and the power grid enterpriseⁱ(i ═ a, b), the cost of both parties in collaboratively developing the renewable energy service project is set asSince two parties may end up competing in a collaborative process, the cost incurred by the obsolete renewable energy services is set asThe part of the cost includes the time generated for terminating the cooperative relationship, the cost of the related fee, and the like, wherein the default money to be paid for terminating the cooperative relationship is set as D, and the default money can be obtained by the parameter settingThe income matrix of the power generation enterprise and the power grid enterprise for collaborating and developing the comprehensive energy service project is as follows:

according to the scheme, the yield of the selected cooperation of the power generation enterprises is as follows:

the yield of the power generation enterprise selection competition is as follows:

the average income of power generation enterprises is as follows:

the yield of the power grid enterprise selection cooperation is as follows:

the yield of the power grid enterprise selection competition is as follows:

the average yield of the power grid enterprise is as follows:

the replicon dynamic equation of the power generation enterprise is as follows:

when F' (x) ═ 0, x can be obtained^a＝0、x^b＝1、

The replication subsystem dynamic equation of the power grid enterprise is as follows:

when F' (y) ═ 0, y is obtained^a＝0、y^b＝1、

According to the scheme, simultaneous equations (7) and (8) can obtain that the system has 5 equilibrium points, which are respectively: (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1) (x)^*，y^*) (ii) a Assuming that the determinant and the trace of the Jacobian matrix are respectively D and T, when D is more than 0 and T is less than 0, the point is an evolution stable strategy, when D is more than 0 and T is more than 0, the point is an unstable strategy, and when D is less than 0, the point is a saddle point; the Jacobian matrix for the tournament game is as follows:

according to the scheme, the equilibrium point and the stability of the system equation are analyzed in the plane of R { (x, y) |0 ≦ x ≦ 1 and 0 ≦ y ≦ 1 ≦ according toAndthe constraint condition can be obtained as

The implementation of the auxiliary decision method for expanding the comprehensive energy service market of the power grid enterprise based on the dynamic evolution visual angle has the following beneficial effects:

by the method for the power grid enterprise to participate in the comprehensive energy service market and the result of the example simulation verification, the measure for improving the occupation rate in the comprehensive energy service market is provided for the power grid enterprise, and the strategy guidance can be provided for the power grid enterprise in the process of transforming the comprehensive energy service provider.

Drawings

The invention will be further described with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples, in which:

FIG. 1(a) is an evolution diagram of a power grid enterprise and a power generation enterprise collaborating to develop an integrated energy service project;

FIG. 1(b) is a phase diagram of a power grid enterprise and a power generation enterprise collaborating to develop an integrated energy service project;

FIG. 2 is a path of evolution of government financial rewards to power generation enterprise policies;

FIG. 3 is a revenue-added versus power generation enterprise policy evolution path;

FIG. 4 is a cost-input versus power generation enterprise policy evolution path;

FIG. 5 is a termination cooperation versus power generation enterprise policy evolution path;

FIG. 6 is a breach fund to power generation enterprise policy evolution path;

FIG. 7 is a strategy selection evolution path when the power grid enterprise revenue is high;

FIG. 8 is a power grid enterprise policy selection evolution path during late-stage revenue reduction of a project;

FIG. 9 is a strategy selection evolution path when the cost of the power grid enterprise is high;

FIG. 10 is a power grid enterprise strategy selection evolution path when the cost of a power generation enterprise is high.

Detailed Description

For a more clear understanding of the technical features, objects and effects of the present invention, embodiments of the present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

The auxiliary decision method for expanding the comprehensive energy service market of the power grid enterprise based on the dynamic evolution visual angle is characterized in that on the basis of selecting the power grid enterprise as a research object, another main power generation enterprise of the comprehensive energy service market is taken as a game party, and the strategy selection and the competition behavior evolution process of the power grid enterprise participating in the comprehensive energy service market under the influence of external environmental factors are analyzed by establishing a competition game model based on the evolution visual angle. The invention discloses an auxiliary decision method for expanding a comprehensive energy service market of a power grid enterprise based on a dynamic evolution visual angle, which comprises the following steps: firstly, strategies possibly adopted by power grid enterprises and power generation enterprises in the comprehensive energy service market are analyzed. Secondly, establishing a competition game model represented by a power grid enterprise and a power generation enterprise, analyzing a copy dynamic equation of the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise to obtain an evolution diagram and a phase diagram of the game of the two parties, and further analyzing an evolution path of competition behaviors of external environment changes on the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise. And finally, carrying out example analysis on the competitive game model through numerical simulation, and verifying the effectiveness and the scientificity of the model.

The specific implementation method of the invention is as follows:

strategy possibly adopted by power grid enterprises and power generation enterprises in comprehensive energy service market is analyzed and analyzed

In the integrated energy services market, market entities will consider adopting competitive strategies in order to hold a high market share. When a competition strategy is selected, the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise rely on and exert absolute competition advantages of themselves, and the performance behaviors are as follows: firstly, in the aspect of price formulation, power generation enterprises have rich production information and can meet the power demand of users at a lower price, power grid enterprises have a large amount of power transmission and distribution effective assets, and the energy consumption cost of the users can be reduced in the forms of retail price discount, demand response and the like; secondly, the power generation enterprise provides differentiated energy supply packages and the like for different users, and the power grid enterprise provides an energy utilization optimization scheme and the like according to the energy data of the users in the aspect of providing differentiated products; thirdly, in the aspect of marketing products, power grid enterprises obtain market share by means of brand and user advantages, and power generation enterprises occupy market positions according to existing market competition consciousness and power generation operation experience.

To consolidate market position for long term market share, the market body will consider the collaborative strategy. When a cooperation strategy is selected, a power grid enterprise and a power generation enterprise usually aim to realize advantage complementation, and the performance behaviors are as follows: the first is to form capital cooperation, for example, a comprehensive energy service company is established by joint funding, the advantages of both parties are fully exerted to develop a certain comprehensive energy project to rapidly occupy market share; the other method is to form industrial chain cooperation so as to form an industrial interconnection platform as a cooperation basis, power grid enterprises give full play to market and user advantages and investment operation advantages, power generation enterprises give full play to equipment set advantages, and deep cooperation is realized through platform data sharing in the same project.

(II) establishing competitive game model represented by power grid enterprise and power generation enterprise

1) Basic assumptions

Based on the characteristics of transformation comprehensive energy service providers of power grid enterprises and power generation enterprises, the following basic assumptions are made for the model:

assume that 1: the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise cannot effectively share information, the information between the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise is not completely public and transparent, and the two parties follow the principle of rationality in the game process.

Assume 2: if a power grid enterprise and a power generation enterprise jointly develop a certain comprehensive energy service project by selecting a cooperation strategy, the project efficiently utilizes energy and protects the environment, and then the enterprises of the two parties not only obtain good social public opinion, but also obtain additional financial rewards of the government.

Assume that 3: if the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise diverge in the process of cooperating with a certain project to cause cooperative failure, competition is developed for the purpose, and the party who stops the cooperation and wants to develop the competition needs to pay default money stipulated by the cooperative contract to the other party.

Assume 4: the probability of the power generation enterprises selecting cooperation is x, and the probability of the selection competition is 1-x; the probability of the power grid enterprise selection cooperation is y, and the probability of the selection competition is 1-y. x and y are both functions of time t.

2) Model building

The power generation enterprise (the participating main body a) and the power grid enterprise (the participating main body b) have own conventional stable income before cooperation, and the conventional income is set asThe additional benefit obtained by the two parties through the cooperative development of the comprehensive energy service project is set asB is set as a financial reward issued by the government for the comprehensive energy service project cooperatively developed by the power generation enterprise and the power grid enterpriseⁱ(i ═ a, b), the cost of both parties in collaboratively developing the renewable energy service project is set asSince two parties may end up competing in a collaborative process, the cost incurred by the obsolete renewable energy services is set asThe part of the cost includes the cost such as time generated for terminating the cooperative relationship and related cost, wherein the default money to be paid for terminating the cooperative relationship is set as D. The income matrix of the power generation enterprise and the power grid enterprise for cooperating and developing the comprehensive energy service project can be obtained by setting the parameters, and is shown in table 1. From the 4 scenarios of the revenue matrix described in Table 1, it can be seen that: the yield of the power generation enterprise selection cooperation is as follows:

the yield of the power generation enterprise selection competition is as follows:

the average income of power generation enterprises is as follows:

the yield of the power grid enterprise selection cooperation is as follows:

the yield of the power grid enterprise selection competition is as follows:

the average yield of the power grid enterprise is as follows:

the replicon dynamic equation of the power generation enterprise is as follows:

when F' (x) ═ 0, x can be obtained^a＝0、x^b＝1、

The replication subsystem dynamic equation of the power grid enterprise is as follows:

when F' (y) ═ 0, y is obtained^a＝0、y^b＝1、Simultaneous equations (7) and (8) can give the system 5 equilibrium points, which are: (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1) (x)^*，y^*). Assuming that the determinant and trace of the Jacobian matrix are D and T respectively, when D is greater than 0 and T is less than 0, the point is an Evolution Stable Strategy (ESS), when D is greater than 0 and T is greater than 0, the point is an unstable strategy, and when D is less than 0, the point is a saddle point. The Jacobian matrix for the competitive game is shown below, and the system equilibrium point stability analysis is shown in Table 2:

analyzing the equilibrium point and stability of the system equation in the R { (x, y) |0 ≦ x ≦ 1,0 ≦ y ≦ 1} plane according toAndthe constraint condition can be obtained as Under the constraint condition, 5 equilibrium points of the system are analyzed respectively, and the results are shown in table 3. From the local stability analysis results listed in table 3, it can be seen that there are two ESS, i.e., O (0, 0) -both grid and power generation enterprises choose to collaborate and M (1, 1) -both grid and power generation enterprises choose to compete, L (0, 1) and N (1, 0) are instability points, Q (x) is^*,y^*) Is a saddle point.

3) Model analysis

According to the replication dynamic equation of the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise, an evolutionary graph of the two-party game can be obtained, as shown in fig. 1(a), a phase graph of the two-party game can be drawn from the evolutionary graph, as shown in fig. 1(b), as can be seen from the evolutionary graph and the phase graph, after multiple games, 3 possible results exist:

(1) the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise both choose cooperation, and M (1, 1) is a balance point;

(2) both sides choose to compete, in which state O (0, 0) is the equilibrium point;

(3) maintained at the saddle point Q (x)^*,y^*). If the system is in the area ONQL, the system gradually approaches to O (0, 0), namely, a power grid enterprise and a power generation enterprise both select a competitive relationship; if in the region MNQL, the system will gradually get closer to M (1, 1), i.e. both choose to cooperate.

The direction of the game evolution of the two parties depends on the area size of the area ONQL and the area MNQL, if S_ONQL>S_MNQLThe probability of both parties selecting the competition strategy is greater than the probability of selecting cooperation, if S_ONQL<S_MNQLAnd the probability of selecting cooperation between the two parties is greater than the probability of selecting a competition strategy, so that the influence factors of strategy selection of power generation enterprises and power grid enterprises can be analyzed by analyzing the areas of the area ONQL and the area MNQL. Due to S_ONQL+S_MNQLTherefore, the impact of the same influencing factor on adherence to collaboration and selection competition is opposite.

According to (10), there can be obtained:

conclusion 1: government financial reward BⁱThe larger the amount, the greater the probability that the grid enterprise will opt to stay in collaboration with the power generation enterprise.

ByCan know S_ONQLIs BⁱWith a monotonically decreasing function of BⁱIncrease of S_ONQLGradually decrease, S_MNQLThe probability that the system is close to M (1, 1) is increased gradually, which shows that the probability that the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise select to cooperate is increased under the condition that the amount of the government financial reward is increased.

Conclusion 2: additional income obtained by power grid enterprises and power generation enterprises through cooperative development of comprehensive energy service projectsThe greater the probability that both parties choose to insist on.

ByCan know S_ONQLIs thatMonotonically decreasing function of, withIncrease of S_ONQLGradually decrease, S_MNQLThe probability that the system is close to M (1, 1) is higher and higher gradually, which shows that the power grid enterprises and the power generation enterprises tend to select cooperation if the profit of jointly developing the comprehensive energy project is higher.

Conclusion 3: time and related cost and other costs of power grid enterprises and power generation enterprises caused by termination of cooperative relationshipThe larger the probability of two-party election competition.

ByCan know S_ONQLIs thatMonotonically decreasing function of, withIncrease of S_ONQLGradually decrease, S_MNQLThe probability that the system approaches to M (1, 1) is increased gradually, that is, the willingness of the two parties to select cooperation is increased gradually if the cost such as time, related cost and the like paid by the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise for terminating the cooperation relationship is increased.

Conclusion 4: cost paid by power grid enterprise and power generation enterprise in cooperation development of comprehensive energy service projectBook (I)The greater the probability that both parties choose a competing relationship.

ByCan know S_ONQLIs thatMonotonically increasing function of, withIncrease of S_ONQLGradually increase in S_MNQLThe probability of the system approaching to O (0, 0) is higher and higher gradually, so that the probability of the selection competition of the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise is higher along with the higher cost of the cooperative development of the comprehensive energy service project.

Conclusion 5: with the increase of the amount of the default fund D, the probability of the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise selecting the cooperative development of the comprehensive energy service project is gradually increased.

ByCan know S_ONQLIs a monotonically decreasing function of D, with increasing D, S_ONQLGradually decrease, S_MNQLAnd the probability that the system approaches to M (1, 1) is increased gradually, namely, the power grid enterprise and the power generation enterprise tend to select a cooperative development comprehensive energy service project to avoid the default fund with a large payment amount.

4) Example analysis

It can be known from the five conclusions that financial rewards, extra income and development cost of the comprehensive energy service project, related expenses generated by the two parties for terminating the cooperative relationship, default funds and the like all influence the willingness of the two parties to cooperate, and the part assumes two scenarios for verifying the conclusion of the previous statement.

Scenario one: assume that at a selected initial cooperation probability and B^a＝B^b、D^a＝D^bUnder the situation of (3), the strategy selection evolution path of the competitive game of the two parties is researched by the change of different variables.

And analyzing the evolution path selected by the strategies of the two parties by taking numerical simulation of the power generation enterprise as an example. According to the constraint conditionsThe values of the relevant variables were analyzed mathematically, as follows.

(1) Government financial reward (B)ⁱ) Influence on the strategy selection evolution path of power generation enterprises and power grid enterprises. Assuming that the initial cooperation probability of the power generation enterprise is 0.2, as can be seen from fig. 2, the government provides financial rewards for related comprehensive energy service projects to prompt the power generation enterprise and the power grid enterprise to select cooperation strategies, and for a certain comprehensive energy service project, the larger the amount of the financial rewards of the government, the larger the slope of the evolution path is, and the faster the selection and cooperation speed is. Therefore, if the government increases financial rewards for the comprehensive energy service project, the power generation enterprises and the power grid enterprises can form a situation of cooperatively developing the comprehensive energy service project in a faster time.

(2) Additional revenue for collaborative development of integrated energy service projectsInfluence on the strategy selection evolution path of power generation enterprises and power grid enterprises. Assuming that the initial cooperation probabilities of both parties are 0.1, as can be seen from fig. 3, as the generation enterprises and the power grid enterprises obtain additional revenue through cooperative development of the comprehensive energy service projects, the strategies of both parties will gradually evolve in the direction of cooperation, and the rate is faster and faster. If the profit of the integrated energy service project developed through cooperation is enough to make up the cost investment in the early period and profit can be obtained from the profit, the cooperation between the power generation enterprise and the power grid enterprise is strengthened.

(3) Cost investment for collaborative development of integrated energy service projectsInfluence on the strategy selection evolution path of power generation enterprises and power grid enterprises. In order to more intuitively represent the strategy selection of the two parties, the probability of initial cooperation of the two parties is assumed to be 0.5, as can be seen from fig. 4, the cost for the power generation enterprise and the power grid enterprise to cooperatively develop the comprehensive energy service project affects the strategy selection of the two parties, the two parties are more biased to select the competitive strategy along with the gradual increase of the cooperation input cost, and the higher the cooperation input cost is, the faster the change rate is. Therefore, if the cost of the cooperative development of the comprehensive energy service project is higher and higher, and even when both parties can obtain profits through profits, the power generation enterprises and the power grid enterprises are more inclined to select competitive strategies and develop the comprehensive energy service project meeting the benefits of the power generation enterprises and the power grid enterprises independently.

(4) Double-party termination of cooperative relationship generated related feeInfluence on the strategy selection evolution path of power generation enterprises and power grid enterprises. Assuming that the initial cooperation probability of the power generation enterprise is 0.2, as can be seen from fig. 5, when the cost generated by stopping the cooperation relationship between the power generation enterprise and the power grid enterprise is higher and higher, the two parties are more willing to select cooperation, and the rate of selecting cooperation is increased; the power generation enterprise or the power grid enterprise pays certain time, cost and other costs for terminating the cooperative relationship, and when the costs are higher and higher, the two parties can avoid the competitive relationship as much as possible to generate unnecessary costs.

(5) And (3) stopping the influence of the default money (D) paid by the cooperative selection competition strategy on the strategy selection evolution path of the power generation enterprise and the power grid enterprise. Assuming that the initial cooperation probability of the power generation enterprise is 0.2, as can be seen from fig. 6, as the amount of the default fund increases, the power generation enterprise and the power grid enterprise evolve to a stable point of adhering to cooperation, and the rate is accelerating. Therefore, the default fund can prevent the two parties from selecting to terminate the cooperation and start the competition policy to a certain extent, and if the amount of the default fund is larger and larger, the effect of inhibiting the selection of the competition policy is more and more obvious.

Scenario two: suppose that the two parties to the game are at B, C_A、C_E、R_AAnd D, under different scenes, researching strategies of competing and combining games of the two parties by the change of different cooperation probabilities and selecting an evolution path.

And analyzing the evolution path selected by the strategies of the two parties by taking the numerical simulation of the power grid enterprise as an example. According to replicon dynamic equations and constraint conditions of both game partiesReducing the Condition variable to C_E-D-B-C_A(early investment cost) and R_E(late earnings) two parts were evaluated for hypothesis development and an example analysis was performed as follows.

(1) The investment cost is the same in the early stage and the profit (R) is obtained in the later stage_E) And selecting an evolution path for analysis according to the strategy of the power generation enterprise and the power grid enterprise under different conditions. When the gaming parties can recover the cost in the cooperation process, but the income of the power grid is higher than that of the power generation enterprise, as shown in fig. 7, the probability of most curves tends to 1 over time, namely the power grid enterprise is more willing to cooperate. When the early income of a certain comprehensive energy project is a positive value, the income is gradually reduced along with the fierce market competition in the later period, as shown in fig. 8, most curve probabilities tend to 1 first and then inflection points tend to 0 gradually, that is, the power grid enterprises tend to select a cooperation strategy, but the comprehensive energy project may be abandoned and the competition strategy may be reselected along with the lapse of time.

(2) And (4) carrying out strategy selection evolution path analysis on the power generation enterprises and the power grid enterprises under the conditions that the later profits of both game parties are equal and the earlier investment cost is different. When the later-period benefits generated by the game parties are positive values and the investment cost of the power grid enterprise is obviously higher than that of the power generation enterprise, as shown in fig. 9, the probability of most curves is gradually reduced to 0, namely the power grid enterprise has higher probability to stop cooperation and select a competition strategy. When the input cost of the power generation enterprise is significantly more than that of the power grid enterprise, as shown in fig. 10, the probability gradually tends to 1 as the majority of the curves increase with time. At this time, although the grid enterprises tend to select the cooperation strategy, whether the two parties can achieve cooperation depends on the cooperation intention of the power generation enterprises.

Drawings

TABLE 1 government-driven revenue matrix for power grid enterprises and power generation enterprises cooperating to develop comprehensive energy service projects

TABLE 3 local stability analysis results of Power grid enterprises and Power Generation enterprises cooperative Integrated energy service projects driven by government

While the present invention has been described with reference to the embodiments shown in the drawings, the present invention is not limited to the embodiments, which are illustrative and not restrictive, and it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various changes and modifications can be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined in the appended claims.