阅读说明：本技术 基于非对称密钥池对和密钥卡的外网接入身份认证方法和系统 (Based on unsymmetrical key pond to and key card outer net access identity authentication method and system ) 是由 富尧 钟一民 邱雅剑 于 2019-07-12 设计创作，主要内容包括：本申请涉及一种基于非对称密钥池对和密钥卡的外网接入身份认证方法和系统,本发明中,使用的密钥卡是独立的硬件隔离设备。公钥、私钥和其他相关参数均存储在密钥卡中的数据安全区,被恶意软件或恶意操作窃取密钥的可能性大大降低,也不会被量子计算机获取并破解。由于在经典网络中均无涉及公私钥及算法参数的传递,因此非对称密钥被破解的风险很低,所以消息的安全性得到极大的保障。密钥卡保障了通信双方在群组中的通信安全,也极大的提高了身份认证的安全性,从而实现了抗量子计算的外网接入系统。(This application involves it is a kind of based on unsymmetrical key pond to and key card outer net access identity authentication method and system, the present invention in, the key card used is independent hardware isolated equipment.A possibility that public key, private key and other relevant parameters are stored in the data safety area in key card, steal key by Malware or malicious operation substantially reduces, and will not be obtained and be cracked by quantum computer.Since, without the transmitting of public and private key and algorithm parameter is related to, the risk that unsymmetrical key is cracked is very low, so the safety of message is greatly ensured in classic network.Key card has ensured communication security of the communicating pair in group, also greatly improves the safety of authentication, to realize the outer net access system of anti-quantum calculation.)

1. based on unsymmetrical key pond to and key card outer net access identity authentication method, which is characterized in that the outer net connects Entering identity identifying method includes:

Client generates the first random parameter, and takes out first service station public key using first random parameter, utilizes itself The client private key of storage and first service station public key are according to DH agreement generation first key；Generate the second random parameter simultaneously Client temporary public key is generated using second random parameter；The temporary public key is signed using client private key to obtain One signature；First message is generated, the first message includes client device parameter, the first random parameter, and described in utilizing The client temporary public key of first key encryption and the first signature；The first message is sent to service station；

The service station acquisition verifies first signature after decrypting the first message, generates third random parameter and simultaneously utilizes The third random parameter generates service station temporary public key；It is close that second is generated using client temporary public key and third random parameter Key；It generates the 4th random parameter and takes out second service station private key using the 4th random parameter, the visitor stored using itself Family end public key and second service station private key are according to DH agreement generation third key；Utilize second service station private key and service station Temporary public key generates the second signature；Using service station temporary public key, client temporary public key and second service station private key are generated Third signature；Second message is generated, the second message includes service station device parameter, the 4th random parameter, utilizes described the The third signature of two keys encryption and second signature encrypted using the third key；Institute is sent to the client State second message；

The client obtains, decrypt the second message after verify second signature and third signature, pass through rear confirmation the Two keys are session key, and using client private key to service station temporary public key, client temporary public key signs to obtain the 4th label Name, generates third message, and the third message includes client device parameter and the 4th signature using the encryption of the second key；To The service station sends the third message；

The service station acquisition verifies the 4th signature after decrypting the third message, is meeting by the second key of rear confirmation Talk about key.

2. outer net access identity authentication method as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that it is random that the client generates first First key position indicator pointer is generated using first random parameter after parameter, and using the first key position indicator pointer from certainly First service station public key is taken out in the service station public key pond of body storage.

3. outer net access identity authentication method as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that it is random that the service station generates the 4th Parameter simultaneously using the 4th random parameter generate the second cipher key location pointer, using the second cipher key location pointer from itself Second service station private key is taken out in the service station private key pond of storage.

4. outer net access identity authentication method as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that the client temporary public key is by Two random parameters are generated according to discrete logarithm public key computational algorithm.

5. outer net access identity authentication method as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that the service station temporary public key is by Three random parameters are generated according to discrete logarithm public key computational algorithm.

6. outer net access identity authentication method as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that the client generates client and faces When public key after cache second random parameter, after obtaining, decrypting the second message, utilize the second random ginseng of own cache Several and service station temporary public key generates second key, and is signed using third described in second key authentication.

7. a kind of client device, including memory and processor, the memory are stored with computer program, feature exists In the processor is realized in outer net access identity authentication method described in claim 1 when executing the computer program The step of about client.

8. a kind of service station equipment, including memory and processor, the memory are stored with computer program, feature exists In the processor is realized in outer net access identity authentication method described in claim 1 when executing the computer program The step of about service station.

9. based on unsymmetrical key pond to and key card outer net access identity Verification System, which is characterized in that including be equipped with visitor Family end, service station and communication network；The client is configured with client key card, is stored in the client key card Service station public key pond, client public key and client private key；The service station is configured with service station key card, the service station Service station private key pond, client public key pond are stored in key card；

Outer net access identity authentication method described in claim 1 is realized by the communication network in the client, service station The step of.

Technical field

This application involves safety communication technology field, more particularly to based on unsymmetrical key pond to and key card outer net Access identity authentication method and system.

Background technique

The current internet communication technology is fast-developing, and the equipment such as our computer, mobile phone are all passed in internet all the time Pass, share various internet messages, at the same internet message and various application messages realized all between outer net and Intranet connection or Shared (outer net: internet；Intranet: also known as local area network, usually with firewall or other ID authentication devices barrier in internet it Outer localized network).

Intranet be in contrast it is safe, can stop most of assault from outer net, but still the thing that can divulge a secret Part.Since there are many unsafe factors for outer network environment complexity, such as: the attack of hackers loophole, virus infection etc., when Carve the safety that threaten Intranet.User needs to access Intranet, then may result on internet not while using outer net The factor of safety enters Intranet, directly the message safety of threat Intranet as relay point by client.Therefore in order to ensure net The safety of network, can by outer net access authentication server to user identity authentication after, just allow attachment to Intranet, and give certain The access service to Intranet of permission.Authentication is the basic fundamental of message safety, system by examine the identity of user come Confirm whether the user has the access and access right to certain resource, so outer net access authentication server can be counted as It is the portal that outer net member accesses inner-mesh network system.

But outer net access authentication server is also the link being easiest to by attack.Currently, generally using firewall Stop to attack, but the design and configuration of the softwares such as firewall and application program, VPN or Ethernet protocol stack be likely to It starts a leak.Moreover, CPU itself is also likely to be present loophole, then Intranet is also possible that by invermination or straight Attack is connect, this there is the risk that outer net access authentication server is invaded.Therefore, the safer outer net access of one kind is found to recognize The technical issues of card system and authentication method are current guarantee network security urgent need to resolve.

With the development of quantum computer, classical rivest, shamir, adelman will be no longer safe, either certification or plus solution Close field.Due to the potential threat of quantum computer.Therefore the existing outer net based on quantum communications service station Yu quantum key card Access authentication system and the scheme of certification are carried out outer using the pool of symmetric keys between quantum communication service station and quantum key card Net access identity certification, to avoid using the authentication process of classical rivest, shamir, adelman to be cracked by quantum computer.

Summary of the invention

Based on this, it is necessary in view of the above technical problems, provide it is a kind of can reduce service station storage data quantity based on Unsymmetrical key pond to and key card outer net access identity authentication method.

This application discloses based on unsymmetrical key pond to and key card outer net access identity authentication method, the outer net Access identity authentication method includes:

Client generates the first random parameter, and takes out first service station public key using first random parameter, utilizes The client private key and first service station public key of itself storage generate first key according to DH agreement；Second is generated to join at random It counts and second random parameter is utilized to generate client temporary public key；It is signed using client private key to the temporary public key To the first signature；First message is generated, the first message includes client device parameter, the first random parameter, and utilization The client temporary public key and the first signature of the first key encryption；The first message is sent to service station；

The service station acquisition verifies first signature after decrypting the first message, generates third random parameter simultaneously Service station temporary public key is generated using the third random parameter；The is generated using client temporary public key and third random parameter Two keys；It generates the 4th random parameter and takes out second service station private key using the 4th random parameter, stored using itself Client public key and second service station private key according to DH agreement generate third key；Utilize second service station private key kimonos Business station temporary public key generates the second signature；Using service station temporary public key, client temporary public key and second service station private key Generate third signature；Second message is generated, the second message includes service station device parameter, and the 4th random parameter utilizes institute State the third signature of the second key encryption and second signature using third key encryption；It is sent out to the client Send the second message；

The client acquisition verifies second signature and third signature after decrypting the second message, by rear true Recognizing the second key is session key, and using client private key to service station temporary public key, client temporary public key signs to obtain the Four signatures, generate third message, and the third message includes client device parameter and the 4th label using the encryption of the second key Name；The third message is sent to the service station；

The service station acquisition verifies the 4th signature after decrypting the third message, passes through the second key of rear confirmation For session key.

In one embodiment, the client utilizes first random parameter generation first after generating the first random parameter Cipher key location pointer, and first service is taken out from the service station public key pond that itself is stored using the first key position indicator pointer It stands public key.

In one embodiment, the service station generates the 4th random parameter and generates second using the 4th random parameter Cipher key location pointer takes out second clothes using the second cipher key location pointer from the service station private key pond that itself is stored Business station private key.

In one embodiment, the client temporary public key is by the second random parameter according to discrete logarithm public key computational algorithm It generates.

In one embodiment, the service station temporary public key is by third random parameter according to discrete logarithm public key computational algorithm It generates.

In one embodiment, the client caches second random parameter after generating client temporary public key, obtain, After decrypting the second message, it is close that described second is generated using the second random parameter and service station temporary public key of own cache Key, and signed using third described in second key authentication.

Disclosed herein as well is a kind of client device, including memory and processor, the memory is stored with calculating Machine program, the processor realize outer net access identity authenticating party described in above-mentioned technical proposal when executing the computer program In method about client the step of.

Disclosed herein as well is a kind of service station equipment, including memory and processor, the memory is stored with calculating Machine program, the processor realize outer net access identity authenticating party described in above-mentioned technical proposal when executing the computer program In method about service station the step of.

Disclosed herein as well is based on unsymmetrical key pond to and key card outer net access identity Verification System, including set There are client, service station and communication network；The client is configured with client key card, the client key card memory Contain service station public key pond, client public key and client private key；The service station is configured with service station key card, the clothes Service station private key pond, client public key pond are stored in the key card of business station；

The client, service station realize that outer net access identity described in above-mentioned technical proposal is recognized by the communication network The step of card method.

In the present invention, the key card used is independent hardware isolated equipment.Public key, private key and other relevant parameters are deposited A possibility that storing up the data safety area in key card, stealing key by Malware or malicious operation substantially reduces, will not It is obtained and is cracked by quantum computer.It is non-since nothing is related to the transmitting of public and private key and algorithm parameter in classic network The risk that symmetric key is cracked is very low, shares in addition, carrying out key using QKD between service station and service station, so message Safety greatly ensured.Key card has ensured the communication security of communicating pair, also greatly improves authentication Safety.

Disposable unsymmetrical key pond solves pool of symmetric keys and brings key storage pressure to quantum communications service station simultaneously Power reduces carrying cost.For example, the pool of symmetric keys size of original users is 1G, user's number is N, then quantum communications Service station needs to store the pool of keys of N G, and if storing disposable unsymmetrical key pond, in the case where user's number is N, Quantum communications service station only needs to store the key of the corresponding N number of disposable private key of N number of user and N number of previous disposable private key Pond.And for client, the key card of each client no longer needs to store a large amount of keys, does not have to the key card of client There is larger storage demand, to reduce the cost of client key card.The one time key of this patent is primary to being used only, and Each identifying procedure is changed to new key pair, energy significant increase security of system, but increases amount of storage and key point The workload matched.

Detailed description of the invention

Fig. 1 is the anti-quantum calculation outer net access service station structure schematic diagram in the present invention；

Fig. 2 is the pool of keys distribution schematic diagram of the key board at anti-quantum calculation outer net access service station in the present invention；

Fig. 3 is the pool of keys distribution schematic diagram of client key card in the present invention；

Fig. 4 is the identifying procedure figure of client and anti-quantum calculation outer net access service station in the present invention.

Specific embodiment

It is with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments, right in order to which the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the application are more clearly understood The application is further elaborated.It should be appreciated that specific embodiment described herein is only used to explain the application, not For limiting the application.Wherein the service station in the application is quantum communications service station in the case where not doing specified otherwise, Each title in the application is subject to letter and number and is combined, such as Q, service station Q, service station indicate same meaning below, That is service station Q；Such as one's own side's private key SKA again, SKA, client private key SKA, key SK A hereinafter indicate same meaning, i.e., Client private key SKA, remaining title is similarly.

This application discloses based on unsymmetrical key pond to and key card outer net access identity authentication method, the outer net Access identity authentication method includes:

Client generates the first random parameter, and takes out first service station public key using first random parameter, utilizes The client private key and first service station public key of itself storage generate first key according to DH agreement；Second is generated to join at random It counts and second random parameter is utilized to generate client temporary public key；It is signed using client private key to the temporary public key To the first signature；First message is generated, the first message includes client device parameter, the first random parameter, and utilization The client temporary public key and the first signature of the first key encryption；The first message is sent to service station；

The service station acquisition verifies first signature after decrypting the first message, generates third random parameter simultaneously Service station temporary public key is generated using the third random parameter；The is generated using client temporary public key and third random parameter Two keys；It generates the 4th random parameter and takes out second service station private key using the 4th random parameter, stored using itself Client public key and second service station private key according to DH agreement generate third key；Utilize second service station private key kimonos Business station temporary public key generates the second signature；Using service station temporary public key, client temporary public key and second service station private key Generate third signature；Second message is generated, the second message includes service station device parameter, and the 4th random parameter utilizes institute State the third signature of the second key encryption and second signature using third key encryption；It is sent out to the client Send the second message；

The client acquisition verifies second signature and third signature after decrypting the second message, by rear true Recognizing the second key is session key, and using client private key to service station temporary public key, client temporary public key signs to obtain the Four signatures, generate third message, and the third message includes client device parameter and the 4th label using the encryption of the second key Name；The third message is sent to the service station；

The service station acquisition verifies the 4th signature after decrypting the third message, passes through the second key of rear confirmation For session key.

In one embodiment, the client utilizes first random parameter generation first after generating the first random parameter Cipher key location pointer, and first service is taken out from the service station public key pond that itself is stored using the first key position indicator pointer It stands public key.

In one embodiment, the service station generates the 4th random parameter and generates second using the 4th random parameter Cipher key location pointer takes out second clothes using the second cipher key location pointer from the service station private key pond that itself is stored Business station private key.

In one embodiment, the client temporary public key is by the second random parameter according to discrete logarithm public key computational algorithm It generates.

In one embodiment, the service station temporary public key is by third random parameter according to discrete logarithm public key computational algorithm It generates.

In one embodiment, the client caches second random parameter after generating client temporary public key, obtain, After decrypting the second message, it is close that described second is generated using the second random parameter and service station temporary public key of own cache Key, and signed using third described in second key authentication.

Disclosed herein as well is a kind of client device, including memory and processor, the memory is stored with calculating Machine program, the processor realize outer net access identity authenticating party described in above-mentioned technical proposal when executing the computer program In method about client the step of.

Disclosed herein as well is a kind of service station equipment, including memory and processor, the memory is stored with calculating Machine program, the processor realize outer net access identity authenticating party described in above-mentioned technical proposal when executing the computer program In method about service station the step of.

Disclosed herein as well is based on unsymmetrical key pond to and key card outer net access identity Verification System, including set There are client, service station and communication network；The client is configured with client key card, the client key card memory Contain service station public key pond, client public key and client private key；The service station is configured with service station key card, the clothes Service station private key pond, client public key pond are stored in the key card of business station；

The client, service station realize that outer net access identity described in above-mentioned technical proposal is recognized by the communication network The step of card method.

The present invention realize scene be one based under unsymmetrical key pond body system outer net equipment A (i.e. client) with it is interior The service station of outer net access in net carries out mutual identity authentication.Each object has key in pool of keys system of the invention Card, can store the key of big data quantity, also have the ability of processing message.In the present invention, object A and outer net access service station All there is the algorithm of corresponding demand in local system.

The description of key card is visible, and application No. is the patents of " 201610843210.6 ".When for mobile terminal, key card Preferably key SD card；When for fixed terminal, key card is preferably key USBkey or host key board.

With application No. is compared with the patent of " 201610843210.6 ", key card to issue mechanism similar.This patent The key card side of issuing be key card supervisor side, the generally administrative department of group, such as the pipe of certain enterprise or public institution Reason department；The member's that the key card side of being awarded is managed by the supervisor side of key card, generally certain enterprise or public institution is each Grade employee.Supervisor side's application that user terminal arrives key card first is opened an account.After user terminal carries out registering granted, it will obtain close Key card (has unique key card ID).Key card stores client enrollment registration message.Under same quantum communications service station Public key pond in client key card is all downloaded from down the same Key Management server, and its each client key card for issuing The public key pond of middle storage is completely the same.Preferably, the pool of keys size stored in key card can be 1G, 2G, 4G, 8G, 16G, 32G, 64G, 128G, 256G, 512G, 1024G, 2048G, 4096G etc..

Key card is developed from smart card techniques, is combined with real random number generator (preferably quantum random number Generator), cryptological technique, the authentication of hardware security isolation technology and encryption and decryption product.The embedded chip of key card and Operating system can provide the functions such as secure storage and the cryptographic algorithm of key.Due to it with independent data-handling capacity and Good safety, key card become the safety barrier of private key and pool of keys.Each key card has the protection of hardware PIN code, PIN code and hardware constitute two necessary factors that user uses key card.I.e. so-called " double factor authentication ", user is only simultaneously The key card and user's PIN code for saving relevant authentication message are obtained, it just can be with login system.Even if the PIN code of user is let out Dew, as long as the key card that user holds is not stolen, the identity of legitimate user would not be counterfeit；If the key card of user is lost It loses, the person of picking up also cannot counterfeit the identity of legitimate user due to not knowing user's PIN code.

In the present invention, key card is divided into service station key card and client key card.In Fig. 2, service station key card Key zone is mainly stored with client public key pond, service station private key pond；In Fig. 3, the key zone of client key card is mainly deposited Contain service station public key pond and client a pair of public private key pair.The key card is issued by Key Management server.

Key Management server selects Diffie-Hellman algorithm before issuing key card.Key Management server root Respective numbers are generated according to the quantity of client and meet the number of the algorithm specification as private key and public key.Key Management server produces The ID of raw respective numbers, and the public private key pair of respective numbers is chosen, take public key therein and ID to be combined to obtain ID/ public key, Formation public key pond file, i.e., above-mentioned client public key pond in same file are written in the form of ID/ public key.Meanwhile key pipe Corresponding private key is also written to formation private key pond file, i.e. client private key pond in file by reason server in an identical manner. The ID of each private key is identical as the ID of corresponding public key in client public key pond in client private key pond.Key Management server is again The number for largely meeting the algorithm specification is generated as private key and public key.Public and private key is respectively written into two by Key Management server Service station public key pond and service station private key pond are formed in a file.Public key and service station private key Chi Zhongxiang in the public key pond of service station Private key with position is corresponding.The first key card issued is defined as service station key card by Key Management server, and will service Stand private key pond and client public key pond and related algorithm parameter write-in key card key zone.Key Management server is subsequent to be issued The key card of hair is client key card.Key Management server randomly selects a unappropriated ID and distributes to key card, And the public and private key of identical ID and the key of service station public key pond write-in key card are taken from client public key pond and client private key pond Area, relevant parameter are written in key card together.

The present invention such as Fig. 1 is a kind of outer net access authentication system based on key card, the anti-quantum calculation connecting with Intranet Outer net access service station connects outside network device as hardware access card using key board.Hardware access card externally passes through outer Net connection client, hardware access card internally pass through peripheral bus and connect CPU；The CPU connects Intranet by network interface card.Client With hardware access card have to pass through based on unsymmetrical key pond to and key card two-way authentication.The connection of outer net and Intranet is with hard Part access card is as security boundary.

System explanation

The scene of the present embodiment includes that customer end A, anti-quantum calculation outer net access service station Q (referred to as take as shown in Figure 4 Business station Q).Q has Key Management server, and any client is equipped with client key card, and (any client key card is all The Key Management server of service station Q is issued, i.e., customer end A belongs to service station Q).

Step 1: customer end A initiates ID authentication request to authentication service station Q

A root generates a true random number Ra according to matched key card.It is calculated according to Ra by key indicator function close Key position indicator pointer takes out the public key PKQa of Q from the service station public key pond of one's own side's key zone according to cipher key location pointer, takes simultaneously One's own side's private key SKA out obtains Ka=PKQa^SKA by Diffie-Hellman algorithm.

A root generates a random number x according to matched key card, is obtained using x according to discrete logarithm public key computational algorithm Key X=g^x.

A root is signed to obtain SIGN (X, SKA) according to using one's own side's private key SKA to X, and is X with X recombination message | | SIGN (X, SKA), SIGN (X, SKA) indicate to carry out discrete logarithm signature by private key of SKA to X.

The side A is using obtaining key Ka to X | | SIGN (X, SKA) carries out symmetric cryptography and obtains { X | | SIGN (X, SKA) } Ka.

Critical message is reassembled into M1 and is sent to Q request authentication by the last side A, i.e. M1=IDA | | Ra | | X | | SIGN (X, SKA)}Ka。

The verifying side A, the step side 2:Q requests and replys

The side Q is parsed after receiving M1, calculates cipher key location pointer by key indicator function according to the Ra in M1, Private key SKQa is taken out from the private key pond of one's own side's key zone according to cipher key location pointer.According to IDA from the client of one's own side's key zone The public key PKA for taking out A in public key pond is held, Ka=PKA^SKQa is obtained by Diffie-Hellman algorithm.

The side Q is decrypted { X | | SIGN (X, SKA) } Ka using Ka, obtains X | | SIGN (X, SKA), and utilize PKA pairs Signature SIGN (X, SKA) is verified, and is verified, and is carried out in next step.

The side Q generates a random number y, obtains key Y=g^y according to discrete logarithm public key computational algorithm using y.

The side Q obtains key Ks=X^y according to Diffie-Hellman algorithm using Y.

The side Q generates a true random number Rq, cipher key location pointer is calculated by key indicator function according to Rq, according to close Key position indicator pointer takes out private key SKQq from the private key pond of one's own side's key zone, obtains Kq=by Diffie-Hellman algorithm PKA^SKQq。

The side Q is signed to obtain SIGN (Y, SKQq) using SKQq to Y, and forms message Y with Y | | SIGN (Y, SKQq), Recycle Kq to Y | | SIGN (Y, SKQq), which is encrypted, to be obtained Y | | and SIGN (Y, SKQq) } Kq.

The side Q X and Y form message Y | | X, using SKQq to Y | | X is signed to obtain SIGN (Y | | X, SKQq), is recycled Ks is encrypted to obtain { SIGN (Y | | X, SKQq) } Ks to SIGN (Y | | X, SKQq).

The last side's Q recombination message M2 replys the side A, i.e. M2=IDQ | | Rq | | Y | | and SIGN (Y, SKQq) } Kq | | SIGN (Y | |X,SKQq)}Ks。

Step 3: customer end A receives Q and replies message confirmation session key

The side A receive the side Q reply message M2 after parsed.It is calculated according to the Rq in M2 by key indicator function close Key position indicator pointer takes out the public key PKQq of Q from the service station public key pond of one's own side's key zone according to cipher key location pointer, takes simultaneously One's own side's private key SKA out obtains Kq=PKQq^SKA by Diffie-Hellman algorithm.

The side A is decrypted to obtain Y using Kq to { Y | | SIGN (Y, SKQq) } Kq | | SIGN (Y, SKQq) simultaneously parses this and disappears Breath recycles PKQq to SIGN (Y, SKQq) signature verification, carries out in next step after being verified.

The side A calculates Ks=Y^x by Diffie-Hellman algorithm using the x of Y and local cache.

SIGN (Y | | X, SKQq) decrypts to obtain to { SIGN (Y | | X, SKQq) } Ks using Ks in the side A, recycles PKQq pairs SIGN (Y | | X, SKQq) signature verification.

After the side A is by verifying, confirmation Ks is the session key communicated with anti-quantum calculation outer net access service station Q.

The side A recycles one's own side's private key SKA to X | | Y is signed to obtain SIGN (X | | Y, SKA).

The side A is encrypted to obtain { SIGN (X | | Y, SKA) } Ks to SIGN (X | | Y, SKA) using Ks.

The side A, which finally recombinates the critical message to obtain message M3, to be transmitted to the side Q and confirms, i.e. M3=IDA | | SIGN (X | | Y,SKA)}Ks。

Step 4:Q receives customer end A and replies message confirmation session key

The side Q is parsed after receiving M3, and takes out Ks from caching and { SIGN (X | | Y, SKA) } Ks is decrypted To SIGN (X | | Y, SKA).

Q root takes out the PKA of the side A according to IDA from the client public key pond of one's own side's key zone, using PKA to SIGN (X | | Y, SKA) signature verification.

After the side Q is by verifying, confirmation Ks is the session key communicated with the side A.

So far authentication is completed, and the side Q approves that the side A is legal outer net accessing user, and is pacified using Ks and the side A Full communication lets pass to the transmission data of the side A, i.e., the side A completes safe outer net access at this time.

In the present invention, the key card used is independent hardware isolated equipment.Public key, private key and other relevant parameters are deposited A possibility that storing up the data safety area in key card, stealing key by Malware or malicious operation substantially reduces, will not It is obtained and is cracked by quantum computer.It is non-since nothing is related to the transmitting of public and private key and algorithm parameter in classic network The risk that symmetric key is cracked is very low, so the safety of message is greatly ensured.Key card has ensured communicating pair Communication security in group also greatly improves the safety of authentication, to realize the outer net of anti-quantum calculation Access system.

Unsymmetrical key pond solves pool of symmetric keys and brings key storage pressure to quantum communications service station simultaneously, reduces Carrying cost.For example, the pool of symmetric keys size of original users is 1G, user's number is N, then quantum communications service station needs The pool of keys of N G is stored, and if storage unsymmetrical key pond, user terminal storage pool of keys size is similarly 1G, and quantum is logical Telecommunications services station equally only needs to store the pool of keys of 1G size.Therefore this patent improves anti-quantum calculation outer net access system Key management system.

Meanwhile this patent assists the certification based on Diffie-Hellman algorithm between client and service station with key Business opportunity system improves, so that Diffie-Hellman negotiation data is added by unsymmetrical key pond to resulting symmetric key is calculated Privacy protection.Due to that can only be decrypted by private key owner by the data of public key encryption, all other men can not be decrypted, therefore should be added Close mechanism improves the safety of message transmission, finally improves the safety of the certifiede-mail protocol of outer net access system.

Each technical characteristic of above embodiments can be combined arbitrarily, for simplicity of description, not to above-described embodiment In each technical characteristic it is all possible combination be all described, as long as however, the combination of these technical characteristics be not present lance Shield all should be considered as described in this specification.

The several embodiments of the application above described embodiment only expresses, the description thereof is more specific and detailed, but simultaneously It cannot therefore be construed as limiting the scope of the patent.It should be pointed out that coming for those of ordinary skill in the art It says, without departing from the concept of this application, various modifications and improvements can be made, these belong to the protection of the application Range.Therefore, the scope of protection shall be subject to the appended claims for the application patent.