阅读说明：本技术 一种基于区块链的红包匿名领取方法、设备及储存介质 (Red packet anonymous getting method, device and storage medium based on block chain ) 是由 马登极 王志文 吴思进 于 2021-09-03 设计创作，主要内容包括：本发明属于计算机技术领域,尤其涉及一种基于区块链的红包匿名领取方法、设备及储存介质。本发明提供的方法实现了红包接收者的匿名,首先红包发起者没有参与红包领取交易的构建,无法追溯红包接收者,红包领取交易由红包接受者发起但基于红包合约签名,不透露自身的签名信息,实现匿名转账,保护了自身的隐私,保护领取用户的隐私。(The invention belongs to the technical field of computers, and particularly relates to a red envelope anonymous getting method, device and storage medium based on a block chain. The method provided by the invention realizes the anonymity of the red packet receiver, firstly, the red packet initiator does not participate in the construction of the red packet getting transaction, and cannot trace back the red packet receiver, the red packet getting transaction is initiated by the red packet receiver but is signed based on a red packet contract, the self signature information is not disclosed, the anonymous transfer is realized, the self privacy is protected, and the privacy of the getting user is protected.)

1. A red packet anonymous getting method based on a block chain is characterized by comprising the following contents:

roles in the anonymous red packet robbing method based on the block chain comprise: the system comprises a red envelope sending user, a red envelope receiving user, a red envelope contract and a block chain system, wherein the red envelope contract is deployed on the block chain system;

parameters in the block chain-based anonymous red packet scrambling method comprise: the method comprises the steps of carrying out Hash ID and a check, wherein the check is an uneconomical transaction output with a plurality of token money values, and the Hash ID is obtained by carrying out Hash operation on the number of the token money based on the check and a random number corresponding to the check;

the method comprises the steps that a red packet sending user stores a first check into a contract address of a red packet contract in advance, and sends a Hash ID and a first zero knowledge proof of the first check to the red packet contract, the first zero knowledge proof is used for proving that the Hash ID of the first check corresponds to a first branch, the red packet contract verifies the first zero knowledge proof, if the first zero knowledge proof is verified, the red packet sending user constructs a red packet transaction which costs the first check based on the red packet contract, the red packet sending transaction comprises the first check, a set number of red packet checks and a red packet Hash ID corresponding to each red packet check, the red packet transaction costs the first branch to generate the set number of red packet checks, and the number of tokens contained in each red packet check is distributed by the red packet contract according to a preset distribution rule;

before the red packet sending transaction is established, the red packet sending user presets the number of red packets to be sent; when the red packet sending transaction is established, a red packet sending user selects a corresponding secret random number for each red packet, and generates a red packet hash ID corresponding to each red packet check according to the secret random number of each red packet check and the number of tokens of the secret random number, the red packet sending user sends the generated red packet hash ID to a red packet contract, and the red packet contract stores the red packet hash ID in a first Mercker tree;

the red packet sending user writes all secret random numbers into the red packet private information and publishes the red packet private information through a medium;

a red packet receiving user acquires a pickup certificate based on private information published by a red packet sending user, wherein the pickup certificate is one of all secret random numbers contained in the private information, and each secret random number can be acquired only once;

the method comprises the steps that a red packet receiving user constructs a red packet pickup transaction, a second zero knowledge certificate and a third zero knowledge certificate which are signed by a red packet contract, the red packet pickup transaction, the second zero knowledge certificate and the third zero knowledge certificate are sent to the red packet contract, the red packet contract verifies the second zero knowledge certificate and the third zero knowledge certificate, the verification is passed, a waste hash which is openly input by the third zero knowledge certificate is stored in a block chain waste hash library, and the red packet pickup transaction is sent to a block chain system; wherein the red-envelope pick-up transaction costs the red-envelope checks corresponding to the pick-up voucher to generate a plurality of second checks and transaction costs, and the second zero knowledge proves that the number of tokens of the red-envelope checks corresponding to the pick-up voucher is equal to the sum of the total number of tokens of all the second checks and the number of tokens of the transaction costs; the public input of the third zero knowledge proof comprises a root hash of the first Mercker tree, the number of tokens contained in a red packet acquired by a red packet receiving user and a revocation hash, wherein the revocation hash is a hash value of a random number acquired by the red packet receiving user; the private input with the zero knowledge proof comprises a red packet hash ID corresponding to a red packet acquired by a red packet receiving user, Mercker tree path data corresponding to the red packet hash ID, and a second random number acquired by the red packet receiving user, wherein the Mercker tree path data are generated by the red packet receiving user according to the position of the red packet hash ID of the red packet receiving user in the first Mercker tree.

2. The anonymous pickup method of the red envelope based on the block chain as claimed in claim 1, wherein the sending user of the red envelope publishes the private information of the red envelope by a two-dimensional code.

3. A computer device, characterized by one or more processors;

a memory for storing one or more programs,

the one or more programs, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform the method recited in claim 1 or 2.

4. A storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that the program, when executed by a processor, implements the method according to claim 1 or 2.

Technical Field

The invention belongs to the technical field of computers, and particularly relates to a red envelope anonymous getting method, device and storage medium based on a block chain.

Background

Along with the intelligent development of science and technology, the functions of mobile phone communication software are more and more complete, when holidays come, more and more people send red packages to relatives and friends through the mobile phone communication software to set off the holiday atmosphere, and more businesses and the like also send red packages to the public of society for the purposes of promotion, marketing and the like, the sending and receiving of the red packages are recorded, the information of users receiving the red packages is disclosed, particularly in the technical field of block chains, because the trade needs to be identified in the block chains, the existing red package sending and receiving schemes are displayed, a sender sends the red packages to a contract, the frozen amount or the set number is reserved by a retriever, the existing schemes are not friendly in the scenes that the users want to receive the red packages in privacy, some scenes want to anonymously receive one red package, the receiver does not want to let the sender know who the sender is, for example, the sender can disclose the red package information through a medium, while a user in a particular area may not want others to know, existing solutions are not user-friendly with respect to privacy. Therefore, an anonymous red packet robbing method is needed to protect the privacy of the red packet receiver.

Disclosure of Invention

In order to solve the technical problem, the invention provides a red packet anonymous getting method, device and storage medium based on a block chain, which can protect the privacy of a red packet receiver.

In order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the following technical scheme.

In a first aspect, a red envelope anonymous getting method based on a block chain is provided, which includes the following steps:

roles in the anonymous red packet robbing method based on the block chain comprise: the system comprises a red envelope sending user, a red envelope receiving user, a red envelope contract and a block chain system, wherein the red envelope contract is deployed on the block chain system;

parameters in the block chain-based anonymous red packet scrambling method comprise: the method comprises the steps of carrying out Hash ID and a check, wherein the check is an uneconomical transaction output with a plurality of token money values, and the Hash ID is obtained by carrying out Hash operation on the number of the token money based on the check and a random number corresponding to the check;

the method comprises the steps that a red packet sending user stores a first check into a contract address of a red packet contract in advance, and sends a Hash ID and a first zero knowledge proof of the first check to the red packet contract, the first zero knowledge proof is used for proving that the Hash ID of the first check corresponds to a first branch, the red packet contract verifies the first zero knowledge proof, if the first zero knowledge proof is verified, the red packet sending user constructs a red packet transaction which costs the first check based on the red packet contract, the red packet sending transaction comprises the first check, a set number of red packet checks and a red packet Hash ID corresponding to each red packet check, the red packet transaction costs the first branch to generate the set number of red packet checks, and the number of tokens contained in each red packet check is distributed by the red packet contract according to a preset distribution rule;

before the red packet sending transaction is established, the red packet sending user presets the number of red packets to be sent; when the red packet sending transaction is established, a red packet sending user selects a corresponding secret random number for each red packet, and generates a red packet hash ID corresponding to each red packet check according to the secret random number of each red packet check and the number of tokens of the secret random number, the red packet sending user sends the generated red packet hash ID to a red packet contract, and the red packet contract stores the red packet hash ID in a first Mercker tree;

the red packet sending user writes all secret random numbers into the red packet private information and publishes the red packet private information through a medium; a red packet receiving user acquires a pickup certificate based on private information published by a red packet sending user, wherein the pickup certificate is one of all secret random numbers contained in the private information, and each secret random number can be acquired only once;

the method comprises the steps that a red packet receiving user constructs a red packet pickup transaction, a second zero knowledge certificate and a third zero knowledge certificate which are signed by a red packet contract, the red packet pickup transaction, the second zero knowledge certificate and the third zero knowledge certificate are sent to the red packet contract, the red packet contract verifies the second zero knowledge certificate and the third zero knowledge certificate, the verification is passed, a waste hash which is openly input by the third zero knowledge certificate is stored in a block chain waste hash library, and the red packet pickup transaction is sent to a block chain system; wherein the red-envelope pick-up transaction costs the red-envelope checks corresponding to the pick-up voucher to generate a plurality of second checks and transaction costs, and the second zero knowledge proves that the number of tokens of the red-envelope checks corresponding to the pick-up voucher is equal to the sum of the total number of tokens of all the second checks and the number of tokens of the transaction costs; the public input of the third zero knowledge proof comprises a root hash of the first Mercker tree, the number of tokens contained in a red packet acquired by a red packet receiving user and a revocation hash, wherein the revocation hash is a hash value of a random number acquired by the red packet receiving user; the private input with the zero knowledge proof comprises a red packet hash ID corresponding to a red packet acquired by a red packet receiving user, Mercker tree path data corresponding to the red packet hash ID, and a second random number acquired by the red packet receiving user, wherein the Mercker tree path data are generated by the red packet receiving user according to the position of the red packet hash ID of the red packet receiving user in the first Mercker tree.

Preferably, the red packet sending user publishes the red packet private information through a two-dimensional code.

In a second aspect, a computer device is provided, comprising one or more processors;

a memory for storing one or more programs,

the one or more programs, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform the method as described in the first aspect above.

In a third aspect, there is provided a storage medium storing a computer program which, when executed by a processor, implements the method as described in the first aspect above.

The invention has the advantages that the anonymity of the red packet receiver is realized, firstly, the red packet initiator does not participate in the construction of the red packet getting transaction, the red packet receiver cannot be traced, the red packet getting transaction is initiated by the red packet receiver but is signed based on a red packet contract, the self signature information is not disclosed, the anonymous transfer is realized, the self privacy is protected, and the privacy of the getting user is protected.

Drawings

Fig. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a computer device according to embodiment 2 of the present invention.

Detailed Description

The invention is described in further detail below with reference to specific embodiments and the attached drawing figures. Those skilled in the art will be able to implement the invention based on these teachings. Moreover, the embodiments of the present invention described in the following description are generally only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Therefore, all other embodiments obtained by a person of ordinary skill in the art based on the embodiments of the present invention without any creative effort shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention. Unless otherwise specified, the methods described in the examples of the present invention are all those known to those skilled in the art.

Example 1

The embodiment provides a red envelope anonymous getting method based on a block chain, which comprises the following contents:

roles in the anonymous red packet robbing method based on the block chain comprise: the system comprises a red envelope sending user, a red envelope receiving user, a red envelope contract and a block chain system, wherein the red envelope contract is deployed on the block chain system;

parameters in the block chain-based anonymous red packet scrambling method comprise: the method comprises the steps of carrying out Hash ID and a check, wherein the check is an uneconomical transaction output with a plurality of token money values, and the Hash ID is obtained by carrying out Hash operation on the number of the token money based on the check and a random number corresponding to the check;

the method comprises the steps that a red packet sending user stores a first check into a contract address of a red packet contract in advance, and sends a Hash ID and a first zero knowledge proof of the first check to the red packet contract, the first zero knowledge proof is used for proving that the Hash ID of the first check corresponds to a first branch, the red packet contract verifies the first zero knowledge proof, if the first zero knowledge proof is verified, the red packet sending user constructs a red packet transaction which costs the first check based on the red packet contract, the red packet sending transaction comprises the first check, a set number of red packet checks and a red packet Hash ID corresponding to each red packet check, the red packet transaction costs the first branch to generate the set number of red packet checks, and the number of tokens contained in each red packet check is distributed by the red packet contract according to a preset distribution rule;

before the red packet sending transaction is established, the red packet sending user presets the number of red packets to be sent; when the red packet sending transaction is established, a red packet sending user selects a corresponding secret random number for each red packet, and generates a red packet hash ID corresponding to each red packet check according to the secret random number of each red packet check and the number of tokens of the secret random number, the red packet sending user sends the generated red packet hash ID to a red packet contract, and the red packet contract stores the red packet hash ID in a first Mercker tree;

the red packet sending user writes all secret random numbers into the red packet private information and publishes the red packet private information through a medium; a red packet receiving user acquires a pickup certificate based on private information published by a red packet sending user, wherein the pickup certificate is one of all secret random numbers contained in the private information, and each secret random number can be acquired only once;

the method comprises the steps that a red packet receiving user constructs a red packet pickup transaction, a second zero knowledge certificate and a third zero knowledge certificate which are signed by a red packet contract, the red packet pickup transaction, the second zero knowledge certificate and the third zero knowledge certificate are sent to the red packet contract, the red packet contract verifies the second zero knowledge certificate and the third zero knowledge certificate, the verification is passed, a waste hash which is openly input by the third zero knowledge certificate is stored in a block chain waste hash library, and the red packet pickup transaction is sent to a block chain system; wherein the red-envelope pick-up transaction costs the red-envelope checks corresponding to the pick-up voucher to generate a plurality of second checks and transaction costs, and the second zero knowledge proves that the number of tokens of the red-envelope checks corresponding to the pick-up voucher is equal to the sum of the total number of tokens of all the second checks and the number of tokens of the transaction costs; the public input of the third zero knowledge proof comprises a root hash of the first Mercker tree, the number of tokens contained in a red packet acquired by a red packet receiving user and a revocation hash, wherein the revocation hash is a hash value of a random number acquired by the red packet receiving user; the private input with the zero knowledge proof comprises a red packet hash ID corresponding to a red packet acquired by a red packet receiving user, Mercker tree path data corresponding to the red packet hash ID, and a second random number acquired by the red packet receiving user, wherein the Mercker tree path data are generated by the red packet receiving user according to the position of the red packet hash ID of the red packet receiving user in the first Mercker tree.

The principle of the above technical solution is that, firstly, the transaction method adopted in this embodiment is similar to a mimblewick, the actual amount of the transaction does not appear in the transaction, each transaction amount is configured with a corresponding random number as a private key, the output of the transaction, that is, the commitment in the mimblewick, conforms to the commitment formula c-v-G + r-H, wherein G and H are both in a public state at a generation point on an elliptic curve, v is the actual amount of money transferred, r is the private key of v, the private key thereof must be known when v is used, the transaction is substantially similar to a check, a specific address is not bound, but an address is set by a user who knows the private key, so that an initiator constructs a transaction without knowing the address of a transfer and cannot trace back the address of a receiver The sender has the right to use the first ticket, and a specific proving mode is actually a cryptology problem, which is not the key point of the application, and the relevant content of the zero knowledge proof in the cryptology can be referred to.

In fact, the random value of the first check is actually selected by the red packet sending user, and in general, the random value of the check is selected by the check owning user, the owner of the first check is actually the red packet sending user and only stores the red packet contract account, so that the random number of the first check is selected by the red packet sending user, after the red packet contract verifies the first zero proof, the red packet sending transaction can spend a first number of checks to construct a red packet sending transaction, before the red packet sending transaction is constructed, the red packet sending user determines the number of red packets to be sent in advance and then constructs the red packet sending transaction, the red packet sending transaction comprises the first check, the set number of red packet checks and the red packet hash ID corresponding to each red packet check, the red packet sending transaction spends the first number of checks to generate the set number of red packet checks, and the hash ID is the third zero proof for generating the red packet drawing proof, namely the third zero proof, the drawing logic is described in detail later, and the number of tokens contained in each red-pack check of the red-pack sending transaction is distributed by the red-pack contract according to a preset distribution rule; as mentioned above, each check has a random number as a private key, and therefore, a red packet sending user needs to select a corresponding secret random number for each red packet, and then the red packet sending user can generate a red packet hash ID corresponding to each red packet check according to the secret random number of each red packet check and the number of tokens thereof, and then send the generated red packet hash ID to a red packet contract, and the red packet contract stores the red packet hash ID in a first tacle tree, which is also used for subsequently constructing and obtaining a zero knowledge proof of the red packet check. And after the transaction is built, the red packet sending user sends the transaction to the block chain system for execution and recording, a plurality of red packets are generated by the red packet sending user through the red packet sending transaction, the number of the red packets is set by the red packet sending user, the next time the red packet receiving user is determined, and then the red packet receiving user receives the red packets.

After completing the construction of the red packet sending transaction, the red packet sending user publishes the secret random number of each selected red packet check, the publishing mode can be a mode of integrating in a two-dimensional code and other user code scanning and getting, in short, the red packet sending user publishes the secret numbers, the red packet receiving user gets a getting certificate which comprises one of the secret random numbers published by the red packet sending user, the secret random number can not be repeatedly obtained, the red packet receiving user constructs a red packet getting transaction, a second zero knowledge certificate and a third zero knowledge certificate according to the secret random number, wherein the third zero knowledge certificate and the red packet getting transaction are used in combination, firstly, the red packet contract verifies the third zero knowledge certificate, and the third zero knowledge certificate proves that the red packet receiving user knows the secret random number under the condition that the secret random number is not exposed, the contract verification shows that a person who provides third zero knowledge proof can receive the corresponding red packet check, normally, a red packet receiving user constructs a red packet receiving transaction, then a signature is sent to a block chain, then consensus is carried out, the token in the check is extracted from the contract address of the red packet contract to the address set by the person after the consensus is carried out through the red packet receiving transaction, the problem is that the signature of the red packet receiving user is published, because the receiving transaction of the red packet check is correspondingly recorded, all the persons know that the owner of the signature receives the red packet, the signature is published externally, some organizations or famous persons can almost correspond to the signature of the private key of the organizations or famous persons, the signature is exposed, the privacy of the user is also exposed, therefore, the red packet receiving user constructs the red packet receiving transaction signed by the red packet contract, the exposed signature is a red envelope contract, the price is to pay transaction fee, and provide a second zero knowledge proof to prove that the transaction is legal, so that the red envelope contract can only sign the transaction, so that it is simple to prove that the transaction is legal, the second zero knowledge proof actually constructs an equation, the input of the red envelope pick-up transaction is equal to the output, the input of the red envelope pick-up transaction is a red envelope check, the output is a plurality of second checks and transaction fee, therefore, only the number of tokens of the red envelope check is proved to be equal to the sum of the total number of tokens of all the second checks and the transaction fee, the second check is a check with a random number set by a red envelope receiving user, the random number of the check after being changed into the second check is only known by the red envelope receiving user, and the check belongs to the red envelope receiving user (the original random number is not only used for red envelope receiving, the red envelope sending user knows the secret random number of all red envelope checks and therefore cannot be counted as belonging entirely to the red envelope receiving user).

Then, the third zero knowledge proof in the foregoing is how to prove that the corresponding red packet check can be taken without exposing the secret number, first, the public input of the third zero knowledge proof includes a root hash of a first mercker tree, the number of tokens included in the red packet check acquired by the red packet receiving user, and a revocation hash, and the private input of the zero knowledge proof includes a hash ID corresponding to the red packet check acquired by the red packet receiving user, mercker tree path data corresponding to the hash ID, and a secret random number acquired by the red packet receiving user, where the revocation hash is a hash value of the random number acquired by the red packet receiving user, and the mercker tree path data is generated by the red packet receiving user according to the position of the self red packet hash ID in the first mercker tree; it should be noted that the private input of the zero knowledge proof is input by the person who constructed the proof, and cannot be viewed and modified by others, the public input is visible to all people, and that verifying the zero knowledge proof requires a zero knowledge proof circuit, which is public, and in fact the zero knowledge proof is also constructed based on the proof circuit. In this embodiment, the secret random number of the private input is subjected to hash operation to obtain the revoked hash of the public input, the proving circuit tells you that a component represents the secret random number (the plaintext cannot be seen), and the second component is subjected to hash operation, so that a component can obtain a result by putting the component into the second component, the result is consistent with the public input and is correct, and certainly, whether the second component is subjected to hash operation can be checked before the verification, for example, the number of tokens included in a red packet check acquired by a user for receiving the red packet is input in a public manner, which can be verified by a red packet contract, whether the number is included in one of the numbers allocated by the red packet contract and records the hash ID corresponding to the number, then the number of tokens of the red packet and the secret random number of the hash ID can be calculated, and then the proving circuit tells you that a component is a method for calculating the hash ID and compares the result with the filled hash ID to finally feed back whether the result is equal, for example, three spaces are provided, wherein one space is filled with a secret random number which is filled with a secret input random number, one space is filled with the number of tokens which can be filled, the other space is filled with a secret input hash ID which is filled with a secret input hash ID, and the final feedback is equal to the number of tokens which is input publicly; then, to explain what the private input and the public input cooperate to prove, first, the root hash of the corresponding first tacher tree can be calculated by matching the red packet hash ID of the private input with the corresponding tacher tree path data, and then whether the root hash is consistent with the root hash of the first tacher tree in the public input is compared, through the two private inputs, the red packet hash ID really exists on the chain, so that the corresponding red packet can be obtained really, and through the two private inputs, the two secret inputs are accurately stated to be correct, so that the establishment of a plurality of equations indicates that the secret inputs are not accidental coincidence but are correct really.

In the process of sending the red packet to the receiving party, the red packet sender constructs a red packet sending transaction to generate a red packet check and the red packet check is signed and submitted by a red packet user, so that the red packet sending user can be traced back, and the red packet receiving transaction constructed by a red packet receiving user is signed by a red packet contract when the red packet check is received, so that any information of the receiving party cannot be known, and the privacy of the red packet receiving user is ensured to the maximum extent.

Example 2

A computer device, the device comprising: one or more processors; memory for storing one or more programs that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform the method of embodiment 1.

A storage medium storing a computer program which, when executed by a processor, implements the method as described in embodiment 1 above.

Fig. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of an apparatus provided in this embodiment.

As shown in fig. 1, as another aspect, the present application also provides a computer apparatus 500 including one or more Central Processing Units (CPUs) 501 that can perform various appropriate actions and processes according to a program stored in a Read Only Memory (ROM)502 or a program loaded from a storage section 508 into a Random Access Memory (RAM) 503. In the RAM503, various programs and data necessary for the operation of the apparatus 500 are also stored. The CPU501, ROM502, and RAM503 are connected to each other via a bus 504. An input/output (I/O) interface 505 is also connected to bus 504.

The following components are connected to the I/O interface 505: an input portion 506 including a keyboard, a mouse, and the like; an output portion 507 including a display such as a Cathode Ray Tube (CRT), a Liquid Crystal Display (LCD), and the like, and a speaker; a storage portion 508 including a hard disk and the like; and a communication section 509 including a network interface card such as a LAN card, a modem, or the like. The communication section 509 performs communication via a network such as the internet, and the processing driver 510 is also connected to the I/O interface 505 as necessary. A removable medium 511 such as a magnetic disk, an optical disk, a magneto-optical disk, a semiconductor memory, or the like is mounted on the drive 510 as necessary, so that a computer program read out therefrom is mounted into the storage section 508 as necessary.

In particular, according to the embodiments disclosed in the present application, the method described in the above embodiment 1 may be implemented as a computer software program. For example, embodiments disclosed herein include a computer program product comprising a computer program tangibly embodied on a machine-readable medium, the computer program comprising program code for performing the method described in any of the embodiments above. In such an embodiment, the computer program may be downloaded and installed from a network through the communication section 509, and/or installed from the removable medium 511.

As yet another aspect, the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, which may be the computer-readable storage medium included in the apparatus of the above-described embodiment; or it may be a separate computer readable storage medium not incorporated into the device. The computer readable storage medium stores one or more programs for use by one or more processors in performing the methods described herein.

The flowchart and block diagrams in the figures illustrate the architecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations of systems, methods and computer program products according to various embodiments of the present invention. In this regard, each block in the flowchart or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portion of code, which comprises one or more executable instructions for implementing the specified logical function(s). It should also be noted that, in some alternative implementations, the functions noted in the block may occur out of the order noted in the figures. For example, two blocks shown in succession may, in fact, be executed substantially concurrently, or the blocks may sometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending upon the functionality involved. It will also be noted that each block of the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustration, and combinations of blocks in the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustration, can be implemented by special purpose hardware-based systems which perform the specified functions or acts, or combinations of special purpose hardware and computer instructions.

The units or modules described in the embodiments of the present application may be implemented by software or hardware. The described units or modules may also be provided in a processor, for example, each of the described units may be a software program provided in a computer or a mobile intelligent device, or may be a separately configured hardware device. Wherein the designation of a unit or module does not in some way constitute a limitation of the unit or module itself.

The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the application and is illustrative of the principles of the technology employed. It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the scope of the invention herein disclosed is not limited to the particular combination of features described above, but also encompasses other arrangements formed by any combination of the above features or their equivalents without departing from the spirit of the present application. For example, the above features may be replaced with (but not limited to) features having similar functions disclosed in the present application.